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Abstract:  
In this article, through a comparative study between ILO fundamental Conventions and 
Chinese labor law, the writer points out several problems and shortcomings embodied in Chinese 
labor law. This article analyzes the status of Chinese trade unions and questions their ability to 
protect the interests of the Chinese working class. As for collective bargaining, the writer reviews 
the relevant Chinese labor law and discovers the reasons for the ineffectiveness of the collective 
bargaining system in China. In the case of forced labor, the writer critically evaluates three kinds 
of forced labor in today‟s China. With regard to child labor, according to a review on relevant 
legislations, the writer points out certain internal legislation as contradictory. As far as 
discrimination with regard to employment and occupation is concerned, after a general overview 
on related ILO conventions and Chinese legislation, the writer focuses on employment based on 
social origin in China, using a case study on Chinese farmer workers. In the writer‟s 
understanding, as a vulnerable group, farmer workers have not received enough attention and 
special protection from Chinese labor legislation. 
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I. Introduction 
In this article, through a comparative study between ILO Fundamental Conventions and 
Chinese labor law, the writer points out several problems and shortcomings of Chinese labor law.  
 
The article will be divided into five parts. The first part is introduction; the second is an 
overview of ILO Fundamental Conventions; the third part is background information related to 
China; the fourth part is the comparative study between ILO fundamental Conventions and 
Chinese labor law; the last part is conclusion. 
 
II. Introduction to ILO Fundamental Conventions 
In the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work 1998, the ILO 
governing body declares that “all Members, even if they have not ratified the Conventions in 
question, have an obligation arising from the very fact of membership in the Organization to 
respect, to promote and to realize, in good faith and in accordance with the Constitution, the 
principles concerning the fundamental rights which are the subject of those Conventions, namely:  
 
(a) freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective 
bargaining;  
(b) the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labor;  
(c) the effective abolition of child labor; and  
(d) the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation.”
2
 
 
These rights are enshrined in eight ILO fundamental conventions,
3
 referred to in the 1998 
Declaration as the Fundamental Conventions. They include: (1) Freedom of Association and 
Protection of the Right to Organize Convention, (1948 [No. 87]) which protects the right of 
workers and employers to establish and join organizations according to their own choices without 
prior authorization, and lays down a series of guarantees for the free functioning of organizations 
without any interference by the public authorities;
4
 (2) Right to Organize and Collective 
Bargaining Convention, (1949 [No. 98]) which guarantees workers the right to enjoy adequate 
protection against anti-union discrimination, prohibits mutual interference between worker‟s and 
employer‟s organizations, and provides for measures to promote collective bargaining;
5
 (3) 
Forced and Compulsory Labor Convention, (1930 [No. 29]) which requires member states to 
suppress the use of forced or compulsory labor in all its forms as soon as possible, with certain 
exceptions, such as military service, properly supervised convict labor etc;
6
 (4) Abolition of 
Forced Labor Convention, (1957 [No. 105]) which requires each member state to take effective 
measures to secure the immediate and complete abolition of forced or compulsory labor as a 
means of political coercion or education, punishment for the political dissenters, economic 
development, labor discipline, punishment for participation in strikes, or discrimination;
7
 (5) 
Minimum Age Convention, (1973 [No. 138]) which aims at the abolition of child labor and 
                                                 
2
 Int‟l Labour Org. [ILO] Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, 86 Sess., Geneva 
(June 1998), available at  
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/declaris/DECLARATIONWEB.static_jump?var_language=EN&var_pagename=D
ECLARATIONTEXT, visit date: February 18, 2005, website name: official website of International Labor 
Organization (ILO).  
3
 ILO Fundamental Conventions, available at www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp2.htm, visit date: 
February 18, 2005, website name: official website of ILO.  
4
 Id. Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention, C087. (July 9, 1948).  
5
 Id. Application of the Principles of the Right to Organize and to Bargain Collectively Convention, C098. 
(July 1, 1949). 
6
 Id. Forced or Compulsory Labor Convention, C029. (June 28, 1930).  
7
 Id. Abolition of Forced Labor Convention, C105 (June 25, 1957).  
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requires member states to specify a minimum age for admission to employment not be less than 
the age of completion of compulsory schooling;
8
 (6) Convention Concerning the Prohibition and 
Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor (1999 [No. 182]), 
which requires members to take immediate and effective measures to secure the prohibition and 
elimination of the worst forms of child labor such as slavery, prostitution, drug trafficking etc.
9
 
(7) Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation Convention, (1958 [No.111]) 
which calls for a national policy to eliminate discrimination in access to employment, training, 
and working conditions on the basis of race, color, sex, religion, political opinion, national 
extraction or social origin and to promote equality of opportunity and treatment with regard to 
employment and occupation;
10
  and (8) Equal Remuneration Convention, (1951 [No. 100]) which 
calls for equal pay for men and women for work of equal value without discrimination based on 
sex;
11
 
 
So far, about 60 percent of ILO member states have ratified all eight of the fundamental 
conventions, including not only developed states but also a large number of developing ones.  
 
III. Background Information on China 
A. Background Information on China and Its Economic Development 
Beginning in 1978, China started to engage in a wide range of economic reforms to 
expand and modernize its economy and as a result, “its high growth rate has been sustained with 
relatively minor fluctuations,”
12
 leading the country away from a centrally planned economy
13
 
towards a market economy with socialist characteristics.
14
  
 
With a remarkably rapid economic growth over the last two and a half decades, according 
to statistics from several international organizations and experts, China has become the seventh 
largest economy in the world and it ranks first among the developing world in terms of total 
economic scale.
15
 However, China is still a developing country and it remains among the low-
income countries as far as per-capita GDP is concerned.
16
 “China‟s per capita GDP, though 
reaching the record high of $1000 US dollars last year (2003), still ranks behind the
 
100th place 
in the world.”
17
 According to the China Modernization Reports of 2005, there is a 100 year 
                                                 
8
 Id. Minimum Age for Admission to Employment Convention, C138 (June 26, 1973). 
9
 Id. Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention, C182. (June 17, 1999). 
10
 Id. Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, C111. (June 25, 1958). 
11
 Id. Equal Remuneration Convention, C100. (June 29, 1951). 
12
 Clement A. Tisdell & Joseph C.H. Chai, An Introduction to China‟s Economic Growth and Transition, in 
China‟s Economic Growth and Transition: Macroeconomic, Environmental and Social/Regional 
Dimensions 1 (Clement A. Tisdell & Joseph C.H. Chai eds., Nova Science Publishers, 1997). 
13
 In the 1950s, China‟s socialist government began bringing a majority of economic activity under state 
control and determining production, pricing, and distribution of goods and services. This system is called 
„planned economy‟, or „command economy‟  See Microsoft Encarta Online Encyclopedia 2005, at 
http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761572241_9/Communism.html#p122, visit date: February 13, 2005, 
website name: Encarta. 
14
 Fair Labor Ass‟n, Annual Report 235 (2004) available at 
http://www.fairlabor.org/2004report/pdf/CompleteReport-part4.pdf, visit date: February 12, 2005, website 
name: Fair Labor Association. 
15
 Xinhua News Agency – Brief Introduction to China, available at 
http://202.84.17.11/english/china_abc/neconomy.htm, visit date: February 11, 2005, website name: Xinhua 
Net. 
16
 Id. 
17
 Hu Jintao, President, P.R.C.,  Keynote Address to Boao Forum for Asia (April 24, 2004) available at 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-04/24/content_326000.htm, visit date: April 25, 2005, 
website name: Chinadaily. 
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modernization gap between China and the United States, with estimates of China not joining the 
group of developed countries until 2080.
18
 Of course, its potential for continued growth is great 
given the size of its population, its broad territory, status of current industrial development and its 
leadership‟s positive economic policy pushing towards economic progress. As for the labor force 
in China, it is expected to grow from 755 million in 1990 to its maximum 1013 million in 2025.
19
 
After that, it will start to fall to an estimated minimum of 898 million, and then begin to move up 
again and come to a standstill at about 900 to 920 million.
20
  Nearly 50 percent of the country‟s 
population subsists on not more than two dollars a day, and according to the 2003 United Nations 
Development Program‟s Human Development Report, China ranked
 
104th with on the human 
development scale.
21
  
 
Nevertheless, China‟s past development and its potential for continued growth have been 
widely recognized in international society as a whole. On December 11, 2001, China joined the 
WTO and is becoming one of the world‟s largest foreign direct investment (FDI) recipients. 
22
 
 
In 2004, China's global trade reached 1154.7 billion, the highest mark in its history.
23
 
Nowadays, China not only dominates the international market for its traditional labor intensive 
exports such as apparel, footwear and toy production, but is also moving towards the technology 
sector where a wide range of mechanical and electric products like televisions, computers, DVD 
players and microwave ovens are produced.
24
 
 
 
 
 
B. China’s Ratification Status of the ILO Fundamental Conventions 
For a founding member of ILO, China‟s ratification record of ILO Conventions is not 
that satisfactory. So far, China has ratified twenty-three ILO Conventions,
25
 constituting only 
twelve percent of the total 185 ILO Conventions. As far as the eight fundamental conventions are 
concerned, China has only ratified three of them:
26
 Equal Remuneration Convention (No.100), 
Minimum Age Convention (No.138) and Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention (No.182).
27
 
China has not, however, ratified two fundamental ILO conventions concerning freedom of 
                                                 
18
 100 Years Modernization Gap between China and USA, Laodong Daily, February 19, 2005, at 6. 
19
 He Dan, Zhong Guo Wei Lai Fa Zhan Qu Shi Dui Lao Dong Jiu Ye De Ying Xiang [The Influence of 
China‟s Future Development on Its Labor and Employment] (2004) available at 
http://www.chinapop.gov.cn/rkzh/zgrk/rkysh/t20040326_2639.htm, visit date: February 11, 2005, website 
name: National Population and Family Planning Commission of China. 
20
 Id. 
21
 See supra note 14. 
22
 Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/3846439.stm, visit date: March 9, 2007, website name: 
BBC News.  
23
 China‟s 2004 Foreign Trade Volume Soars to New Heights (video recording in Chinese), available at 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/video/2005-01/12/content_2449233.htm., visit date: February 12, 2005, website 
name: Xinhua Net. 
24
 See supra note 14. 
25
 Number of Ratifications of the ILO Conventions, available at 
http://webfusion.ilo.org/public/db/standards/normes/appl/index.cfm?lang=EN. Visit date: January 30, 2005, 
website name: ILO.  
26
 Ratifications of the ILO Fundamental Conventions, available at 
http://webfusion.ilo.org/public/db/standards/normes/appl/appl-ratif8conv.cfm?Lang=EN. Visit date: 
January 30, 2005, website name: ILO. 
27
 Id. 
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association: Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention (No. 87) 
and the Right to Organize Convention (No. 98), nor has it ratified any fundamental Conventions 
against forced labor. As for Conventions with regard to employment and occupation 
discrimination, China only ratified Convention No. 100 but has not yet ratified Discrimination in 
Respect of Employment and Occupation Convention (No. 111).  
 
IV. Contemporary Chinese Labor Law vs. ILO Fundamental Conventions 
A. Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining in China 
i. Overview of ILO Conventions on Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining 
 
“Freedom of Association is the most basic of all principles underlying the work of 
International Labor Organization (ILO) and the activities of those who toil for social justice.”
28
 
The rights to freely associate and collectively bargain are identified as a fundamental worker‟s 
rights by the ILO and are protected under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
29
 Serving 
as a foundation stone upon which other labor rights could be built and respected, freedom of 
association provides workers with the chance to form and join organizations of their own 
choosing, thereby, defending worker‟s rights and interests in every working place. 
 
According to Convention No. 87, workers have the right to establish and to join 
organizations of their own choosing without previous authorization.
30
 In addition, workers have 
the right to draw up their own constitutions and rules, to elect their representatives, to organize 
their administration and activities and to formulate their programs without interference from 
public authorities.
31
 Moreover, it is each member state‟s obligation to take all necessary and 
appropriate measures to ensure that workers may exercise freely their right to organize.
32
  
 
Convention No. 98 further prohibits anti-union discrimination with respect to 
employment.
33
 Trade unions are free from any interference from employers in their 
establishment, functioning or administration.
34
 The Convention also states that measures shall be 
taken to encourage and promote the full development and utilization of machinery for voluntary 
negotiation between employers and trade unions, with a view to the regulation of terms and 
conditions of employment by means of collective agreements.
35
 
 
ii. Freedom of Association in China 
a. Trade-Union Monopoly in China 
The unions in China consist of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), local 
all-level federation of trade unions, sectoral unions and basic-level unions.
36
 They are organized 
on the principle of democratic centralism
37
 which means that “individuals obey the organization, 
                                                 
28
 Online: < http://www-ilo-mirror.cornell.edu/public/english/standards/norm/whatare/fundam/foa.htm > 
(visit date: February 24, 2007). 
29
 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), Art. 20, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,
 
1st plen. 
mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).  
30
 See supra note 3, C087, Art. 2. 
31
 Id. Art. 3. 
32
 Id. Art. 11. 
33
 See supra note 3, C098 Art.1. 
34
 Id. Art.2. 
35
 Id. Art.4. 
36
 Wang Quanxin, Lao Dong Fa [Labor Law] 129 (Fa Lu Chu Ban She [Law Press], 1997). 
37
 Trade Union Law, Art. 9 (2001) (P.R.C.) available at http://www.lawinfochina.com/index.asp, visit date: 
January 2, 2005, website name: Lawinfochina. 
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the minority obeys the majority, and unions at lower levels obey those at higher levels.”
38
  
Therefore, all of the other trade unions in China are subject to the leadership of the ACFTU 
which was founded on May 1, 1925
 
 with the participation of 166 local unions and over 540,000 
members.
39
 In this sense, the leading global labor organization International Confederation of 
Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) calls the ACFTU a "trade union monopoly."
40
 Although Chinese 
Constitution provides that citizens of the People's Republic of China enjoy freedom of speech, of 
the press, of assembly, of association, of procession and of demonstration
41
 and Chinese Trade 
Union Law 2001 further emphasizes that all laborers shall have the right to participate in and 
form trade union organizations pursuant to the law, regardless of their nationalities, races, sexes, 
occupations, religious beliefs or education, and no organization or individual may hinder them 
from doing so or restrict them,
42
 Article 11 of the Trade Union Law nevertheless restricts workers‟ 
right to freedom of association in China. In specific, it provides that any establishment of a basic-
level trade union, local all-level federation of trade unions or a national or local specific industry 
trade union must be reported to the trade union organization at the next highest level for 
approval.
43
 As such, the establishment of trade union in China is subject to de facto previous 
authorization. Clearly, this provision is inconsistent with the principle of association embodied in 
the ILO Convention No. 87, which provides that workers shall have the right to establish and to 
join organization of their own choosing without previous authorization.
44
 
 
b. Double Roles of Chinese Trade Union 
In accordance with Chinese Trade Union legislation, trade unions are mass organizations 
formed by the working classes of their own free will.
45
 It follows that trade unions are supposed 
to be voluntary unity of the leading class, that is, working class, in China and their status should 
be superior to an ordinary social organization.
46
 From the writer‟s understanding, that is the 
unique characteristic of Chinese trade unions.  
                                                                                                                                                 
Roughly speaking, “democratic centralism” can be described as: “a principle of organization that can be 
used (or abused) by any functioning group. The democratic part of the term defines the equal participation 
and voice expected from all members of the organization. The centralism refers to the mandate that all 
members uphold all decisions made by the democratic process of the organization. In practical terms this 
translates into real participatory democracy within, but with strict discipline expected from all members. 
Even if one member disagrees with a decision, s/he is expected to uphold the decision externally while 
working from within to convince other members that they are wrong. This method of organization is based 
on the assumption that eventually the majority of the members of a group, presented with conflicting views, 
will be able to arrive at the best possible decision. This may be a prolonged process, and mistakes may be 
made, but the democratic element ensures that debate can go on until all members are satisfied.” This idea 
was first put forward by V.I. Lenin and it is regarded as a principle of communist democracy. Maoist Int‟l. 
Movement, Democratic Centralism. available at http://www.etext.org/Politics/MIM/wim/democent.html. 
38
 Albert Hung-yee Chen, An Introduction to the Legal System of the People‟s Republic of China 50 (1992). 
39
 Du Wanqi, Zhong Guo Gong Hui Yun Dong De Qi Shi Nian [Seventy Years Chinese Trade Union 
Movement], 3 Beijing Dang Shi [Beijing Party History] 16 (1995). 
40
 International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, People‟s Republic of China: Annual Survey of 
Violations of Trade Union Rights (2003) available at 
http://www.icftu.org/displaydocument.asp?Index=991217713&Language=EN. Visit date: February 14, 
2005, website name: International Confederation of Free Trade Union. 
41
 Constitution art. 35 (P.R.C.) available at http://www.lawinfochina.com/index.asp, visit date: January 2, 
2005, website name: Lawinfochina. 
 
42
 See supra note 37 Art. 3.  
43
 See supra note 37 art. 11. 
44
 See supra note 3, C087, art.2. 
45
 See supra note 37 art. 2.  
46
 Lin Feng, Employment Law in China, Chinese Law 461 (Wang Guiguo & John Mo, eds., 1999). 
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Chinese Trade Union Law provides that Trade Unions must focus on economic 
development, adhere to the Socialist road and people‟s democratic dictatorship, and insist on the 
leadership of Chinese Communist Part and the guidance of Marxism, Leninism, Mao Zedong 
Thought, and Deng Xiaoping Theory.
47
 Trade unions in China should assist the people‟s 
governments in their work, uphold the leadership or the working classes and support the worker-
peasant alliance which forms the basis of the people‟s democratic dictatorship of socialist state 
power.
48
 In this sense, Chinese trade unions are required by law to work as an assistant to 
authority, i.e., in the interests of Chinese government. Of course, the Trade Union Law also 
provides that the basic function and duty of trade unions is to safeguard the legal rights and 
interests of the employees.
49
  Trade unions must liaise closely with employees, listen to and 
reflect their views and requirements, care for their livelihood, assist them in overcoming 
difficulties and serve them wholeheartedly.
50
 Thus, the law actually requires Chinese trade unions 
to play double roles: one role is to work for the interests of the socialist government, and the other 
role is to act in the interests of the workers. This is only possible when the state and the 
employees are sharing the same interests. Interestingly, the Trade Union Law does not 
incorporate any clauses dealing with situations when the interests of the State and the employees 
are conflicting. In other words, the assumption embodied in this legislation is that the interests of 
the state and employees are consistent.  
 
In reality, however, this is not the case. It has been reported that more than one million 
workers in 30 cities joined the street demonstrations in 1995 with that number increasing to 3.6 
million only three years later.
51
 Other evidence available shows the number is still increasing 
every year.
52
 The famous China Labor Bulletin, based in Hong Kong, confirms that the process of 
"economic restructuring has led to huge pressures on Chinese labor market... many workers laid 
off from State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) have expressed dissatisfaction with the long working 
hours, short-term contracts and miserly benefits that more than not await them in the private 
sector.”
53
 As a matter of fact, over 50,000 workers from the Daqing Oilfield have joined mass 
street demonstrations since March, 2002 to protest against Daqing Petroleum Administration 
Bureau‟s breaking of the agreement on the terms of retrenchment.
54
 These protests were soon 
followed by large scale demonstrations by workers in several big industrial cities in China, 
including its capital, Beijing. The protesters there surrounded the government headquarters, 
                                                 
47
 See supra note 37 art.4. 
48
 Id. art.5. 
49
 Id. art. 6. 
50
 Id.  
51
 Chen Feng, Zai Guo Jia Yu Lao Gong Zhi Jian: Shi Chang Jin Ji Xia Zhong Guo Gong Hui De Jiao Se  
Chong Tu [Between State and Labor: The Contradictory Roles of Chinese Trade Union Under the Market 
Economy], available at http://www.yannan.cn/data/detail.php?id=6141. Visit date: January 4, 2005, 
website name: Tian Yi. 
52
 Qiao Jian & Jiang Yin, Shi Chang Hua Jin Cheng Zhong De Lao Dong Zheng Yi He Lao Gong Qun Ti 
Xing Shi Jian Fen Xi, Analysis on Labor Disputes and Mass Labor Movements in Marketization, Beijing: 
Social Sciences Data Press, 2005. 
53 
Unemployment in China, China Labor Bulletin (1999), available at http://www.china-
labour.org.hk/public/contents/article?revision%5fid=1403&item%5fid=1402, visit date: February 22, 2005, 
website name: China Labor Bulletin. 
54
 Han Dongfang , 50,000 Daqing Oilfield Workers Organise Independent Trade Union, China Labor 
Bulletin (2002), available at 
 http://www.china-labour.org.hk/public/contents/news?revision%5fid=4565&item%5fid=4564, visit date: 
February 23, 2005, website name: China Labor Bulletin. 
 
25 
blocked public traffic and demanded an official solution on the problem of retrenchment.
55
 After 
an unusually long strike due to the problems caused by privatization at a Chinese factory acquired 
by China Resources Enterprises, one scholar commented: “There is similar unrest at factories all 
over the country at the moment and we expect more strikes as China continues its SOE reform.”
56
 
In fact, even a senior officer of ACFTU also admitted that the strike in China is a normal 
phenomenon.
57
  
 
 
Some scholars in China argue that the reason for the aforementioned phenomena is that 
while the interests of the State and employees may conflict in the short run, in the long run, they 
are consistent.
58
 The argument is outlined as follows: when the efficiency of enterprises improves, 
the state benefits through the taxation of these enterprises, and since the state represents its 
people‟s interests, its people will also benefit.
59
 As such, in the long run, state and workers‟ 
interests are consistent.
60
 However, several questions arise: Why are worker‟s short-term interest 
sacrificed for the sake of state‟s long term interest? Could it be possible that the worker‟s short-
term interest might be the genuine long term interest of a state? At the end of the day, who has the 
last say to decide which interests, either short or long term, prevails? Moreover, if this long-term 
state interest argument could survive, it is doubtful as to whether unions in China can really 
protect the legitimate interests of employees or it just serves as a de facto “eye and ear” of the 
state inside every workplace. Some trade union leaders even make similar comments: if we are 
fighting for the interest of workers and then punished or fired by employers, who is going to fight 
for our interests?
61
 In addition, the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association has concluded that 
“many provisions of the Trade Union Act were contrary to the fundamental principles of freedom 
of association and had requested the Government to take the necessary steps to ensure that the 
provisions in question were modified”.
62
 The Committee found that many provisions under 
Chinese Trade Union Law, including sections 4, 11, and 13 result in “the imposition of trade 
union monopoly and the requirement that grass-root unions be controlled by higher-level unions 
and that their constitutions shall be established by the National Congress of Trade Union 
Members; all these constituted major constraints on the right of unions to establish their own 
                                                 
55
 Id. For more information on worker‟s protests in 2002, see ICFTU, People‟s Republic of China: Annual 
Survey of Violation of Trade Union Rights (2003),  
available at http://www.icftu.org/displaydocument.asp?Index=991217713&Language=EN. Visit date: 
February 14, 2005, website name: International Confederation of Free Trade Union. 
56
 Justine Lau , Strike highlights pressure on wages, Financial Times, Oct. 27, 2004, available at  
http://www.china-labour.org.hk/public/contents/news?revision%5fid=5561&item%5fid=5560. Visit date: 
December 27, 2004, website name: China Labor Bulletin.  
57
 Chen Yi, Gai Ge Zhong De Gong Hui He Gong Hui Zhong De Gai Ge [Trade Union Reform and Reform 
Inside Trade Union] 142 (1999). 
58
 Please see generally in Zhang Youyu, Some Issues on the Amendment of Constitution (Guan Yu Xiu Gai 
Xian Fa de Ji Ge Wen Ti), (Beijing China: The Mass Press (Qun Zhong Chu Ban She), 1982), from 10 to 
15; Wu Jie, “Discussion on the Political Rights and Freedom of Chinese Citizen” (Lue Lun WoGuo Gong 
Min De Zheng Zhi Quan Li He Zi You) in Luo Yaopei, ed., Thesis Collection on Constitutional Law (Xian 
Fa Lun Wen Ji), [Beijing China: The Mass Press (Qun Zhong Chu Ban She), 1982], from 180 to 184. 
59
 Id. 
60
 Id. 
61
  Available at http://www.people.com.cn/GB/guandian/35560/2744402.html, visit date: December 25, 
2004, website name: Renmin Wang. 
62
 International Confederation of Free Trade Unions [ICFTU], Complaint against the Government of 
People‟s Republic of China presented by International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU): 321st 
Report (Case No. 2031), available at http://www.oit.org.pe/sindi/english/casos/chn/chn200001.html. Visit 
date: December 26, 2004, website name: ILO. 
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constitutions, organize their activities, and formulate programs.”
63
 The committee reminds that 
the mission of trade unions should be to defend and promote the interests of their constituents 
rather than reinforcing the country's political and economic system.
64
  
 
As is widely accepted, trade unions play a very important role in keeping a balance 
between the power of government, business interests and worker‟s interests in a modern industrial 
society. The fast development of Multinational Corporations (MNCs), the deregulation of 
finance, the end of Cold War and the wave of liberalizing trade have undermined the trade 
union‟s role as leverage; however, the importance of trade union has only increased. As China 
becomes more and more involved in the global economy, especially after its entering into the 
WTO, the interests of the socialist government, especially government at the local level, and its 
workers are no longer as consistent as before.  According to a social investigation report in China, 
in order to attract investment both foreign and domestic, and in order to collect more local annual 
revenue, some local Chinese governments tried to avoid the implementation of Chinese labor law 
within their regions.
65
 Even worse, some of them have enacted certain local policies which 
sacrifice the dignity of the national labor legislation and the interests of workers while benefiting 
investors.
66
 In this sense, local governments and employers are part of the same interest group. 
Take the city of Shenzhen as an example. Theoretically speaking, the main responsibility of labor 
bureau there is to adjust the worker-employer relationship and to protect the interests of both 
sides without prejudice.
67
 In reality, the main task of it is to operate as a basic labor station which 
is a constituent of the local government.
68
 As such, it has to follow the instruction of the local 
government, who at the same time shares the same interests as employers/investors. Therefore, it 
is difficult to expect the impartial performance of the basic labor station there.  
 
As discussed above, the role of Chinese trade unions to protect the legitimate interests of 
workers has become more and more important recently, especially when local governments and 
employers start to share the same interests. Therefore, in the writer‟s point of view, it is high time 
for Chinese labor law to be modified with regard to freedom of association and collective 
bargaining.  
 
iii. Right to Collective Bargaining in China 
a.   General Legislation on Collective Bargaining in China 
Chinese labor legislation does not contain an exact term for “collective bargaining.” The 
closest terminologies are “collective negotiation” and “collective contract.”
69
 In accordance with 
Chinese Labor Law, the workers of an enterprise may sign a collective contract with the 
management regarding issues of pay, working hours, rest and vacation, safety and health, 
insurance and welfare.
70
 Collective contracts are to be developed through collaboration between 
the labor union and management.
71
 In the absence of a trade union, they are to be signed by 
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representatives of the workers and the management.
72
 The Regulation on Collective Contract of 
People‟s Republic of China established by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security further 
specifies every aspects of collective contract, such as its negotiation procedure, its content, its 
approval, examination and dispute settlement. With all of these inclusions, it seems that Chinese 
labor law has recognized worker‟s right to collective bargaining.  
 
However, there are still difficult aspects worthy of mentioning. Chinese labor law only 
provides that the workers of an enterprise may sign a collective contract with the management
73
 
instead of recognizing the worker‟s specific right to sign a collective contract. Thus, the 
explanation of the word “may” brings about some controversy. Could it mean that both workers 
and employers have the right to choose either sign a collective contract or not? Or, if workers 
have required negotiating a collective contract, do employers have an obligation to cooperate or 
have a right to refuse?
74
 So far, the law fails to provide a clear binding interpretation regarding 
this point. 
 
b.   The Efficacy of the Legislation with Regard to Collective Bargaining  
According to data provided by the Department of Labor Relations and Wages, part of 
China‟s Ministry of Labor and Social Security, the number of collective contracts signed and 
registered with the Ministry exceeded 240,000 by the end of 2000 and covered more than 60 
million workers, constituting only about six per cent of Chinese labor force.
75
 Generally speaking, 
the quality of the collective contract is unsatisfactory. Most of them only reiterate the working 
conditions that already exist in the working place.
76
 Even worse, some so called collective 
contracts are just copies of certain standard contracts embodying general and obscure clauses 
without de facto maneuverability.
77
 Furthermore, most of these agreements were products of an 
administrative process between the ACFTU and management rather than the real fruit of 
collective bargaining.
78
 Thus, it is probably better to call them “documents” rather than 
“collective contracts” that are the product of bargaining process between two different parties.  
 
c.   Reasons for the Failure of Collective Bargaining System in China 
The lack of independence of Chinese trade unions is the primary problem in collective 
bargaining in China. As discussed above, it is questionable whether Chinese trade unions are 
actually able to protect worker‟s interests, or are just an administrative agency under the control 
of Chinese Communist Party.
79
 Even worse, in some non-state sectors, the trade unions are 
actually under the control of the employers. It is reported that a large number of trade unions 
within non-state enterprises are, in fact, under the control of the bosses or their representatives.
80
 
It is rumored (sarcastically) that the chairwomen of those trade unions are actually the wives of 
                                                 
72
 Id. 
73
 See supra note 70. 
74
 As for this point of view, several Chinese scholars such as Chang Kai and Zhou Changzheng share the 
same view as the writer. 
75
 See supra note 14 at 238. For more information on Chinese labor force, see supra  notes 19, 20. 
76
 Yu Yu Lan, Jia Qiang Gong Hui Ji Ti Tan Pan Neng Li, Ying Dui Lao Dong Guan Xi Guo Ji Hua Tiao 
Zhan [Strengthen the Capability of Collective Bargaining of Trade Union and Prepare For the 
Internationalized Labor Relations], 5 Zhong Gong hang Zhou Shi Wei Dang Xiao Xue Bao [Journal of 
Hangzhou Chinese Communist Party School] (2002). 
77
 Id. 
78
 See supra note 75. 
79
 See  supra Part III (A) (ii) (b), for more analysis on this issue. 
80
 Chang Kai, WTO, Lao Gong Biao Zhun Yu Lao Gong Quan Yi Bao Zhang [WTO, Labor Standards and 
Labor Interests Safeguard], 1 Zhong Guo She Hui Ke Xue [Chinese Social Science] (2002).  
 
28 
the bosses.
81
 Simply put, trade unions in China are either an attachment of government or of 
private employers without their own free will.  “Collective bargaining” usually occurs between 
two parties: workers and enterprises, which are under the control of either government or private 
employers. Without independence, trade unions can not represent the interest of their workers; 
instead, they are under the influence of either government or employers, who at the same time are 
the other party during the process of collective bargaining. In other words, a rhetorical “two-party 
bargaining” is just window dressing. Simply put, there is hardly any bargaining at all.  
 
Secondly, in the absence of trade unions in some industries, the chance to conclude an 
effective collective contract is very low. It is reported that there are more than 90 percent of non-
state-owned enterprises failing to establish trade unions.
82
 Although the law has anticipated this 
situation, the feasibility of its provision is problematic. It provides that in the absence a trade 
union, it (a collective contract) shall be signed by representatives of the workers and managers.
83
  
 
Generally speaking, the background of labor relations in non-public sector assumes that 
capital resources are scarce and the labor supply is much larger than demand. Therefore, the 
bargaining power of workers and employers is quite unbalanced. When there is no trade union 
involvement, it is questionable whether those poorly organized workers dare to or are willing to 
choose their representatives to negotiate with employers given the fact that many desperate 
jobless are waiting to replace them at any time. Moreover, the candidature of the representative is 
another problem. Who is willing to take the risk of being fired to negotiate with employers? Very 
few, if anyone at all. 
 
Thirdly, the right to strike is critical to the success of a collective contract.
84
 Under the 
market economy, one of the critical incentives for workers and employers to reach a final 
collective agreement is that both sides have threats at their disposal: employers could close the 
factory and workers could go to strike ---- a last resort, “whose use could be readily justified by 
good workers against bad employers in defense of established rights, or in furtherance of claims 
expressing minimum needs.”
85
 The competition of these two threats guarantees the bargaining 
power of both sides. As far as right to strike is concerned, its existence compensates the 
comparative disadvantage of the workers and adjusts the unbalanced bargaining power. However, 
even more than twenty years after China established its socialist market economy, it is still not 
clear whether the right to strike exists in China. It is inaccurate to say that workers in China have 
no right to strike since this right has not been prohibited by law expressly.
86
 However, neither the 
Chinese Constitution nor Chinese law provides for the right to strike. In other words, there is a 
vacuum within legislation with regard to the right to strike. This vacuum only decreases the 
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chance to balance the bargaining power between workers and employers. As such, it is hard to 
expect a real fair bargaining in the foreseeable future. 
 
B. Forced Or Compulsory Labor in China 
i. Overview of ILO Fundamental Conventions Relating to Forced Labor 
ILO Convention No. 29 defines “forced and compulsory labor” as “all work or service 
which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person 
has not offered himself voluntarily.”
87
 Meanwhile, it also provides several exceptions to “forced 
labor,” including military service,
88
 normal civic obligations,
89
 prison labor,
90
 emergencies,
91
 and 
minor communal services.
92
  
 
ILO Convention No. 105 further provides that member states shall take effective 
measures to secure the immediate and complete abolition of forced or compulsory labor
93
 in the 
following forms: 
 
(a) as a means of political coercion or education or as a punishment for holding or 
expressing political views or views ideologically opposed to the established political, 
social or economic system; 
 (b) as a method of mobilizing and using labor for purposes of economic development; 
 (c) as a means of labor discipline; 
 (d) as a punishment for having participated in strikes; 
 (e) as a means of racial, social, national or religious discrimination.
94
 
 
China has not ratified either of the two conventions mentioned above. 
 
ii. Forced Labor in China: Three Types of Forced Labor 
a. The First Type of Forced Labor: Normal Workers 
There are three kinds of forced labor in China, the first being normal workers. Both 
Chinese labor law and criminal law have explicitly prohibited forced labor of this type. Under the 
Labor Law, a worker may notify the employer of his decision to dissolve the labor contract at any 
time if the employer compels a worker to work by the use of force, threat or by means of illegally 
restricting personal freedom.
95
 In addition, if an employer compels workers to work by use of 
force, threat or by restoring to the means of restricting personal freedom or insults, punishes 
physically, beats, illegally searches or takes workers into custody, the public security organ shall 
detain the persons responsible for less than 15 days or levy a fine or give a warning and, if the 
case is serious enough to constitute crime, a criminal responsibility is attached.
96
 According to 
Chinese Criminal Code, where an employer, in violation of the laws and regulations on labor 
administration, compels its employees to work by restricting their personal freedom, if serious 
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enough, the persons who are directly responsible for the offense shall be sentenced to fixed-term 
imprisonment of not more than three years or criminal detention and/or be fined.
97
 
 
Forced labor of this type started to emerge with the development of the market economy 
in China and it is a trend that it is increasing. For the sake of making as much profit as possible, 
some private enterprises have actually engaged in forced labor practice. It is reported that workers 
in some private enterprises are forced to work overtime without extra pay.
98
 Sometimes, security 
guards are employed whose main task is not for the security of factory or its personnel, but to 
monitor workers‟ action and prevent their exit.
99
 Any worker who is even suspected to possibly 
run is subject to physical violence.
100
 Forced labor of this type is not only existent in small sized 
private enterprises located in rural areas, but is also found in relatively bigger enterprises, even 
joint ventures, whose locations are in large cities such as Shanghai, Guangzhou, Fuzhou, among 
other cities.
101
 Thus, it is submitted that legislation itself is not the reason for the spread of the 
first type of forced labor in China. Implementation of the law is the critical issue. 
 
b. The Second Type of Forced Labor: Convicted Labor Reform System (Laogai) 
The second type of forced labor is that of the convicted criminal, that is, prison labor. As 
discussed above, the definition of forced labor under Convention No. 29 is subject to several 
exceptions, one of which is prison labor exception, that is, any work or service exacted from any 
person as a consequence of a conviction in a court of law, provided that the said work or service 
is carried out under the supervision and control of a public authority and that the said person is 
not hired to or placed at the disposal of private individuals, companies or associations.
102
 
Concretely put, the prison labor exception is qualified by three criteria: (a) conviction via judicial 
procedure, (b) supervision by public authority and (c) no private sector involvement. On its face, 
the prison labor system in China is consistent with the exception. Prisoners working in labor 
reform enterprises have gone through judicial process and have been convicted by court in 
accordance with relevant criminal provisions.
103
 Moreover, the work carried out by prisoners is 
under the supervision and control of the prison,
104
 which, at the same time, is subject to the 
supervision of people's procuratorate.
105
 In this sense, two criteria have been met. The problem 
lies in failure to meet the third criterion. 
 
After the Chinese Communist Party came into power, it stated that one of the purposes 
for labor reform system in China is to serve as a method of mobilizing and using labor for 
national economic development.
106
 The then Minister of Public Security, Luo Ruiqing, pointed 
out that “forced labor...is possessed of the greatest political and economic 
significance...Compulsory labor will produce wealth for the Government.”
107
 Encouraged by 
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China‟s great leader, Deng Xiaoping, labor reform camps became de facto enterprises.
108
 In 1980, 
the national government created a dual responsibility system for prison labor, under which labor 
reform enterprises must meet individual achievement indexes for not only individual reform but 
production purposes as well.
109
 Labor reform administrators are required to adhere to the 
traditional emphasis of reforming prisoners into new socialist persons, all the while reaching 
certain productivities and profit levels.
110
 Naturally, the so-called “double responsibility” resulted 
in an increased emphasis on production and a de-emphasis on the well being of prisoners.
111
 In 
this sense, the Chinese labor reform system serves as a method of mobilizing and uses labor for 
the purpose of economic development, which is clearly conflicts with relevant ILO Convention 
provisions, including Article 2(b) within Convention No.105.
112
 
 
Moreover, reports claim that the Chinese government has not only encouraged products 
from labor reform camps to enter the international market, but labor reform enterprises 
themselves enter foreign markets and even establish joint ventures with international 
businesses.
113
 According to official published Chinese statements, exports from prison labor total 
$100 million each year.
114
 Harry Wu, one of China‟s famous human rights activists serving 19 
years in Chinese labor reform camp, comments that “all the labor-reform officials talk about is 
getting more foreign money.”
115
 The material well-being of the security personnel and the 
prisoners is only important as it is linked to the profitability of the labor reform enterprises.
116
 
After an unrevealed percentage of money earned by the labor reform enterprises goes to the 
central government‟s pocket in the form of taxes and fees, the rest is allocated by the labor reform 
enterprises under their discretion.
117
 Generally speaking, more than forty percent of that money 
may go into the pockets of security personnel and other management in the form of bonuses while 
the prisoners, the working laborers, receive little or even nothing from the earnings of the 
enterprises.
118
  
 
Furthermore, it is reported that most labor reform enterprises have registered as 
companies. For example, Shanxi Boiler Factory is also Provincial Prison No. 2.
119
 Thus, Chinese 
labor reform enterprises actually have two identities: labor reform camp and company. Usually, 
the prison designation is only used by the government internally, and the name of the company is 
displayed to the public, for the sake of business purposes and avoiding the suspicion of foreign 
visitors.
120
 As such, there is a real labor-employment relationship between prison laborer and the 
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labor reform enterprise with the prison laborers actually placed at the disposal of de facto private 
companies who at the same time are labor reform camps which is obviously inconsistent with the 
third criterion of no private sector‟s involvement.
121
  
 
c. The Third Type of Forced Labor in China: Reeducation Through Labor (RTL) System 
(Laojiao) 
 
1. Introduction to RTL System in China 
The third type of forced Labor is the product of China‟s “Reeducation Through Labor” 
(RTL) system. China‟s RTL system, as a unique punishment system, is an administrative sanction 
with no judicial involvement and a mechanism for punishing law-breakers (excluding criminal 
law-breakers). As the foundation stone of the RTL system in China, the 1957 "Decision on the 
Question of Reeducation through Labor" (“1957 Decision”) authorized RTL to be imposed for an 
uncertain period of time for the purposes of reforming those loafers, law and discipline breakers, 
or persons who are able to work but choose to lead an idle life into self-supporting socialist new 
persons, and further maintain public order, therefore, facilitating the socialist construction.
122
 
 
Specifically, persons of the following categories are subject to RTL: 
(1) those who will not engage in honest pursuits, involve themselves in hooliganism,  
commit larceny, fraud or other acts for which they are not criminally liable or violate  
public  security  rules  and  refuse  to  mend  their  ways despite repeated admonition; 
(2)  Counterrevolutionaries and anti-socialist reactionaries who commit minor offences 
and  are  not  criminally  liable  and  who  have  been  given sanctions of expulsion by 
government organs, people's organizations, enterprises or schools, and as a result have 
difficulty in making a living; 
(3)  Employees of government organs, people's organizations, enterprises and schools 
who are able-bodied, but have refused to work for a long period, violated discipline or 
jeopardized public order, and have been given sanctions of expulsion, and as a result have 
difficulty in making a living; or 
(4)  Persons who refuse to accept the work assigned to them or the arrangement made for 
their employment and settlement after their demobilization from military service, or who 
decline to take part in manual labor and production despite persuasion, keep behaving 
disruptively on  purpose,  obstruct  public  officials from performing their duties and 
refuse to mend their ways despite repeated admonition.
123
 
 
Other related legislation is the “Supplementary Provisions for Reeducation through 
Labor”, which was promulgated by the State Council in 1979 (“1979 Provision”). The 1979 
Provision provides that the administrative committees for reeducation though labor shall be 
composed of the persons responsible for civil affairs, public security and labor departments and 
that they shall be responsible for directing and administering the work of reeducation through 
labor.
124
 In other words, there is no involvement of judicial process. As for the term of RTL, it 
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shall be one to three years with one year extension if necessary. 
125
 Only providing for rest 
allowances on Sundays and festivals.
126
 
 
The third related legislation is the “Trial Methods for Reeducation Through Labor”, 
which was passed in 1982 by the Ministry of Public Security with the approval of the State 
Council (“1982 Trial Methods”). This document extends RTL to anyone who commits a 
misdemeanor, joins a criminal organization for murder, robbery, rape, arson, or is involved in 
prostitution, theft, fraud and the like. where the circumstances of such crimes are not serious 
enough to be punished by criminal code. 
127
  
 
2. Assessment of RTL System 
According to ILO Convention No. 29, there are three necessary criteria needed before an 
exception to forced labor could be recognized.
128
 As discussed above, the RTL system, by its 
nature, is an administrative sanction with no involvement of judicial process. Theoretically, an 
administrative committee for reeducation through labor, composed of officials from the civil 
affairs, public security, and labor departments, is responsible for directing and administering the 
work of reeducation through labor.
129
 In practice, the whole process for deciding RTL is under the 
control of police department. The usual procedure is for the police, acting under its own 
discretion, to determine a reeducation term. As such, it is completely subject to the discretion of 
the internal administrative procedure. The recipient of a RTL sentence does not have the right to a 
public hearing, to counsel, or to any kind of judicial determination of his case. Thus, RTL could 
not meet the first criterion for an exception to prohibited forced labor of Convention No. 29, Art. 
2(2)(c): “a consequence of a conviction in a court of law.” The RTL system fails to qualify as a 
legitimate exception to forced labor. In short, China‟s RTL, by its nature, is an institutionalized 
forced labor system with official support.  
 
C. Child Labor in China 
 
i. Overview of ILO Fundamental Conventions relating to Child Labor 
One of the most important conventions relating to child labor promulgated by ILO is 
Convention No.138. With the aim to establish a general instrument to achieve the total abolition 
of child labor,
130
 the Convention provides that each member state is under the obligation to 
pursue a national policy to ensure the effective abolition of child labor and to raise progressively 
the minimum age for admission to employment, and that no one under that age shall be admitted 
to employment or work in any occupation.
131
 Article 2(3) sets the general minimum age at fifteen, 
although Article 2(4) states that countries with insufficient developed economies may set a 
minimum age of fourteen.
132
 Moreover, in the case of work that, by its nature or circumstances in 
which it is carried out is likely to jeopardize the health, safety or morals of young persons, there is 
a blanket prohibition on employment or work of persons less than eighteen years old, providing 
that under certain circumstances, the age could be lowered to sixteen.
133
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ILO Convention No.182 further provides that member states shall take immediate and 
effective measures to secure the prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of child labor as a 
matter of urgency.
134
 It outlines the worst forms of child labor as: 
 
 (a) all forms of slavery or practices similar to slavery, such as the sale and trafficking of 
children, debt bondage and serfdom and forced or compulsory labor, including forced or 
compulsory recruitment of children for use in armed conflict; 
 (b) the use, procuring or offering of a child for prostitution, for the production of 
pornography or for pornographic performances;  
(c) the use, procuring or offering of a child for illicit activities, in particular for the 
production and trafficking of drugs as defined in the relevant international treaties;  
(d) work which, by its nature or the circumstances in which it is carried out, is likely to 
harm the health, safety or morals of children.
135
 
 
China has ratified both Convention No.138 and No.182.  
 
ii. Child Labor Issue in China and Relevant Legislation 
 
a. Child Labor in China 
Great advances have been made in reducing child labor in China since 1949. In Mao‟s
136
 
time, one of the policies aimed at eradicating child labor was free and compulsory education. 
Shortly after the establishment of the People‟s Republic of China, the Chinese government put 
education as a priority of its working agenda, and made enhancing the cultural quality of 
the people the basis of the construction of this socialist regime.
137
 It was estimated that only 20 
percent of China‟s population was literate during that period of time.
138
 The Chinese Communist 
Party made an ambitious program to establish universal public education for such a large 
population. At that time, there was a belief that everyone has the right and obligation to be 
educated. A desire for knowledge permeated the newly founded socialist state.  
 
In addition, at that time, a large scale of nationalization movement was spreading all over 
China. By the 1960s, the government had finished the process of socialization by converting the 
means of production to public control.
139
 Within strict governmental control, there is very little 
chance for the incidence of child labor to work in these state owned enterprises (SOEs). 
Therefore, it could be concluded that child labor was almost non-existent at that time. 
 
However, the evil of child labor started to re-emerge along with the rapid economic 
development. The following are findings relating to child labor in the year 2001: In Wuhan, 
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reports show that there were more than twenty garment factories employing child labor with 
reports of one child dying of calenture.
140
 Also in Wuhan, in a small private Garment factory, 
there were more than two hundred child laborers working more than ten hours per day.
141
 In 
Neihuang county of Henan Province, within three days investigation, the government discovered 
that seven private enterprises have employed twenty-two child laborers (aging from thirteen to 
fifteen).
142
 In Zhenzhou, Henan province, during a one month investigation, the local government 
found twenty-eight cases relating to the employment of child labor, and more than fifty child 
laborers were sent back to their hometowns.
143
 In Jiangxi Province, an explosion at one of its 
rural schools killed forty-two people and most of them were third and fourth year students 
making fireworks at the time of the blast.
144
  In Shanghai, a Japanese-invested garment factory 
was also found to employ child laborers, many working as hard as adults and receiving much less 
pay.
145
  
 
As for the working condition of these child laborers, they could be reflected by one 
child‟s description of her own working condition in a garment small factory. She said, “We have 
been working from September
 
29th to September
 
31st for three consecutive days without any 
sleep. And in the morning of the 31st, I was too tired to work and fell asleep when I was working. 
The machine destroyed my nails. It is really painful…”
146
  
 
Although the extent of child labor remains difficult to assess due to a lack of official 
reporting on cases and the lack of transparency in statistics in China, child labor is not just a 
sporadic phenomenon. On the contrary, it is a spreading trend. The Asian-American Free Labor 
Institute (AAFLI) affirmed that “violations of minimum age standards occur more commonly in 
sub-contracting factories producing for export.”
147 
Some review of current literature suggests that 
child labor in China is found in export industries such as fireworks, garment/textiles, and toys.
148
 
In addition, allegations exist of child labor in Chinese electronics, handicrafts, such as artificial 
flowers, and gun factories, but these allegations” have not been documented.
149
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b. Evaluation of Relevant Legislation 
Generally speaking, China has relatively competent legislation dealing with child labor. 
 
1. Constitution 
The Constitutional provisions explicitly dealing with welfare of children provide for: 
 
(1) Universal, compulsory and free education in China.
150
  
(2) Stipulations that citizens of China not only have the right to education, but have the 
obligation to receive education as well.
151
 
(3) State guarantees that children have a healthy development both psychologically and 
physically.
152
 
(4) State obligation to protect the children.
153
 
 
Thus, China‟s Constitution does guarantee special protection to its children. 
 
2. Labor Law 
The Labor Law prohibits the employment of people below the age of sixteen,
154
 except in 
some extraordinary circumstances, such as in the area of arts, sports and certain special arts and 
crafts. Even under these specials cases, the state‟s approval is a precondition, and the employers 
still must guarantee these employed minors‟ universal rights to the nine year free and compulsory 
education.
155
 On its face, this article not only complies with China‟s obligations under 
Conventions No.138 and No.182, but also raises the standard, that is, the minimum age for 
employment is 16 instead of 15. However, the exception “certain special arts and crafts” provides 
the leeway. The law does not elaborate the special fields, nor does it provide the minimum age of 
employment for these special circumstances. 
 
3. Compulsory Education Law 
The Law on Compulsory Education, which took effect on July 1, 1986, established 
requirements and deadlines for attaining universal education in China and guaranteed school-age 
children the right to receive education. Generally speaking, any child in China above the age of 
six, regardless of gender, nation, or race, has the right to universal education (for those less 
developed areas, the schooling age could be delayed to seven.)
156
 However, according to the 
Implementation Rule on Compulsory Education Law, it seems that there have been changes to 
these standards. In terms of this Implementation Rule, the provincial government is allowed to 
take steps, based on the status of its local economic and social development, to achieve 
progressively the full realization of the right to nine year compulsory education.
157
 Thus, this 
provision actually provides a leeway for the local government to take a gradual step instead of 
immediate measures to universalize the nine-year-compulsory education without a clear deadline. 
Considering that the Chinese Constitution, together with its Compulsory Education Law, has 
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already provided the universal, compulsory and free education in China, it is actually 
unconstitutional and contradictory for the Implementation Rule to stipulate otherwise. 
 
4. Minor Protection Law 
The Minor Protection Law of PRC was especially drafted for the welfare of the people 
under the age of eighteen.
158
 It obligates the state to protect minors and provides that it is actually 
not only the state‟s responsibility but the duty of the whole society as well.
159
 It also provides in 
detail as to how families, schools and other social groups shall protect minors. However, this law 
fails to design any provisions directly relating to prohibition of child labor. It is possible that the 
government does not view child labor as a serious enough problem in China to merit mentioning 
in this law.  
 
5. Criminal Law 
Prior to the promulgation of the fourth amendment of Chinese criminal law
160
 (2002), 
there was no provision relating to prohibition of child labor in Chinese Criminal Code. According 
to the fourth amendment, no one is allowed to employ child laborer under the age of sixteen to 
overwork, work in high altitude, in a mine, or let them be exposed to explosive, flammable, or 
hazardous surroundings. Punishment for violation has been fixed at three to seven years 
imprisonment.
161
  Thus, except for the special cases of overworking child laborers, or employing 
them in dangerous conditions, merely employing a child laborer is not a crime. Clearly, the 
criminal code fails to cover all incidence of child labor.  
 
6. The Order of State Council of People’s Republic of China (No. 364): Provisions on the 
Prohibition of Using Child Labor
162
 
In total, there are fourteen articles under this regulation. It mainly provides that the whole 
society, that is, the families, various civil societies, enterprises (both private and state-owned) and 
governments (both central and local), shall fight against the practice of employing child labor. 
Under the regulation, employers that employ child labor are to be fined 5000 Yuan
163
 (RMB) for 
every child laborer.
164
 Moreover, Article 11 also specifically criminalizes employing child 
laborers to work in the dangerous environment. However, when reading this article carefully, one 
may find certain problems.  
 
 Article 11 provides as follows:  
 
 If anyone abducts a child laborer, coerces a child laborer to work, uses child labor to 
work high above the ground, in a well, in radioactive, highly toxic, flammable or  
explosive environment, or to engage in the work of fourth level physical labor intensity 
provided for by the state, uses child laborers under 14 years old, or causes death or 
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serious disability to a child laborer, the criminal responsibilities shall be prosecuted for 
pursuant to the provisions of the criminal law on the crime of abducting children, the 
crime of coercing another person into labor or other crimes.
165
 
 
Following the logic of this clause, the crime of abducting a child laborer is punished 
under the name of “crime of abducting children.” According to the interpretation from Chinese 
People‟s Supreme Court on the “crime of abducting children,” “child” here is defined as person 
under the age of 14.
166
 However, in the case of child labor, the age is under 16.
167
 If a child 
laborer is abducted under the age of 14, the crime is covered as the “crime of abducting children,” 
if a child laborer is abducted between the age of 14 and 16, however, the chapeau of “crimes of 
abducting children” is no longer suitable. It could be argued that abducting a female child laborer 
between the age of 14 and 16, falls under the crime of “abducting woman”.
168
 However, as for the 
crime of abducting male child labor between the age of 14 and 16, so far, there is no provision 
under the PRC Criminal Code dealing with it directly. In other words, male child laborers aged 14 
to 16 are less protected from abduction under the criminal code. This crime, notwithstanding its 
evil nature, failed to be criminalized under the PRC Criminal Code.  
 
c. Summary of Findings 
Generally speaking, China‟s legislation prohibiting child labor is consistent with ILO 
Conventions No. 138 and No. 182. There is still some leeway both in Labor Law and Compulsory 
Education Law. The Minor Protection Law fails to design any provisions directly relating to child 
labor. There are some controversies within Chinese criminal legislation and it fails to cover all 
cases of child labor. 
 
 
D. Discrimination with Respect to Employment and Occupation in China 
 
i. Overview of ILO Fundamental Conventions No. 100 and No. 111 
According to ILO Convention No. 100, men and women workers are entitled to equal 
remuneration for work of equal value,
169
 which includes the ordinary, basic or minimum wage or 
salary and any additional emoluments whatsoever payable directly or indirectly, whether in cash 
or in kind.
170
 Convention No. 111 further requires member states to eliminate any discrimination 
on the basis of race, color, sex, religion, political opinion, national extraction or social origin, 
which has the effect of nullifying, or impairing equality of opportunity or treatment in 
employment or occupation.
171
 China has ratified Convention No. 100 but not No. 111. 
 
ii. Review of China’s Legislation with Regard to Discrimination in Respect of 
Employment and Occupation 
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Chinese Labor Law has explicitly provided that workers shall not be discriminated in 
aspects of nationality, race, sex and religious beliefs with regard to employment.
172
 The law 
emphasizes that women enjoy the equal rights of employment as men
173
 and also provides special 
protection to female workers.
174
 Moreover, the Woman Rights and Interests Protection Law 
provides special protection for the welfare of female workers and reemphasizes the principle of 
non-discrimination in terms of occupation and employment. However, compared with the 
aforementioned ILO Convention, the Chinese Labor Law keeps silent on the issues of 
discrimination with regard to color, political opinion and social origin.  
 
In case of discrimination based on color, it is hardly a problem given more than 95 
percent of China‟s population is ethnic Chinese and almost 100 per cent of its population is of the 
same race. As far as discrimination based on political opinion is concerned, this concept is very 
much dependent upon China‟s particular political environment.
175
 Before China‟s economic 
reform, almost all the employees in governmental agencies and managers in SOEs were members 
of Chinese Communist Party (“CCP”).
176
 
 
At that time, the government actually employed a 
preferential policy towards members of CCP.
177
 However, with the prosperity of China‟s market 
economy, “political opinion” is becoming less relevant in employment decisions, especially in 
private enterprises that are playing an increasingly important role in China‟s developing 
economy.
178
 Although preferential treatment to CCP members is still a de facto practice in some 
governmental agencies and SOEs, this phenomenon is much more of a political issue than a legal 
one. Thus, merely depending on legal approach to change it is unrealistic and unfeasible. 
Employment discrimination based on social origin may be the most serious form of employment 
discrimination in China. A relatively detailed discussion of this issue follows in the next section. 
 
iii. Review of Employment Discrimination based on Social Origin in China 
 
China‟s 130 million “farm workers” (one tenth of Chinese total population) actually 
constitute China‟s majority industrial workforce.
179
 Most, although not all of them, are from rural 
areas,
180
 meaning that their social origin is classified as “farmer” instead of “urban dweller”. In 
contrast to the western understanding of a farmer, a profession taken up by people of various 
educational backgrounds and involving large scale mechanical equipment, the term farmer in 
China is often associated with poor, dirty, rude and uneducated people. As the major constituent 
of Chinese migrant workers, farm workers have been widely discriminated against based on their 
social origin, despite providing cheap and efficient labor force in China‟s ongoing economic 
development. 
 
a. Discrimination in Payment 
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Farmer workers take on the heavy, dirty, dangerous work distained by their urban 
counterparts, and even when there are rural and urban workers on the same job, they do not 
receive the same benefits. For example, in Wuhan Hebei Province, compared with those cleaners 
with urban origin who are protected by long-term labor contract and paid more than 1000 Chinese 
yuan per month, cleaners with rural origin not only have no chance to be covered by long-term 
labor contract as such, but also paid only 400 yuan per month averagely.
181
 This is a common 
occurrence in many large cities throughout China, including Shanghai, Beijing, Guangzhou and 
Shenzhen. Laborers doing the same job, providing the same contribution, are compensated 
differently due to their different social origin.  
 
Moreover, wage arrears is another wide spread problem for farm workers in China, 
especially in private enterprises.  Some reports even claim that governmental officers are getting 
used to this phenomenon when receiving their pay.
182
 A survey published by the official New 
China News Agency found that nearly 75 percent of the farm workers have trouble collecting 
their salary.
183
 Some farm workers have never even been paid as promised.
184
 A majority of those 
polled shared a common view: begging from, bargaining with or intimidating their employers 
were the best ways to get their money, while only a very few considered seeking help from the 
government and less than two percent considered taking the matter to court to be a good 
choice.
185
 One Chinese labor researcher studying the issue of farm worker‟s payment arrears 
estimated that at least 100 farm workers, most in construction industry, threaten to commit 
suicide due to unpaid wages each year in the Pearl River Delta region alone.
186
 According to the 
official statistics from Shanghai Labor Monitoring Department, in 2004, there were more than 
2702 cases in Shanghai relating to wage arrears of farm workers, involving approximately 
176,300 workers.
187
  
 
b. Discriminatory Local Legislations 
Occupational choices for farm workers are also artificially limited by biased local 
legislation. For example, in Shanghai, legislation has provided that more than twenty kinds of 
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occupations are only available to urban citizens.
188
 In Wuhan, according to “Order of 
Employment of Farm Workers in Wu Han”, occupations are divided into three types: farm 
worker permitted, farm worker limited and farm worker prohibited.
189
 Not only in Shanghai and 
Wuhan, some other cities in China such as Beijing, Shenzhen, Zhenzhou, also enacted similar 
discriminatory local legislation.
190
 As a result, the jobs left for farm workers are either those with 
hazardous working conditions, or those that urban citizens are unwilling to do, such as 
construction work.
191
  
 
c. Discrimination in Terms and Conditions of Employment 
Generally speaking, farm workers have no chance to enjoy the same labor rights as urban 
citizens. Situations like working overtime with no extra pay, being chosen to do dangerous work 
without protective clothing or equipment are familiar to them. If they fall ill, or are injured and 
disabled, they are simply fired without any compensation. In Beijing, in the first 11 months of 
2003, 86.7 percent of industrial-accident deaths involved farm workers.
192
 Moreover, workers 
with from rural areas get no medical insurance, subsidies, or social security insurance,
193
 and their 
rural origin even precludes them from the right to apply for housing subsidies or home loans.  
 
iv.  Analysis of Reasons for Employment Discrimination Based on Social Origin 
China used to completely prevent farmers from working in the cities, pressured by the 
inadequate economic opportunities.
194
 The measures employed by the government to control the 
movement of people from rural areas include the rigid residence registration system,
195
 grain 
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quota system, an employment and welfare system provided solely for  urban residents, as well as 
the forbidding of home leasing or sales.
196
 Although China lifted some of these restrictions in 
1984, those discriminatory measures previously mentioned are still being used today.  
 
Moreover, for a long time, China's trade unions would only embrace and fight for the 
interests of workers with city or township resident identification, leaving more than 100 million 
farmer workers excluded simply because of their rural origin.
197
 Although the ACFTU announced 
in an August 9, 2003 circular that it would start recruiting as many farm workers as possible and 
categorize them as members of China's working classes, however in reality, more than 80 percent 
of farm workers are still uncovered.
198
 Even worse, some autonomous farm workers organizations 
in the coastal province of Zhejiang, have been declared illegal.
199
 This vulnerable group, without 
any organizational protection, is surely subject to unfair treatment in respect of terms and 
conditions of employment. 
 
Some scholars argue that Chinese labor law has provided enough protection for farm 
workers. This argument assumes that farm workers belong to the working class in China, and 
since the working class is well protected by Chinese labor legislation, then farm workers are 
benefited.
200
 However, if this were the case, why does the social security system fail to cover 
them, why do trade unions refuse to represent them, why have they so often been subjected to the 
worst violations of labor standards provided by labor law, including unpaid overtime working, 
hazardous working conditions and wage arrears? Chinese farm workers are probably best 
classified as belong to a special social group: “half farmer half workers.” This group is becoming 
larger and larger with the rapid development of the Chinese market economy. The government, 
both central and local, the law, the employers, and the urban dwellers have not regarded them as 
real workers belonging to Chinese working class. Admittedly, the central government started to 
realize the problem and called for nationwide efforts to safeguard the rights of farm workers,
201
 
but labor legislation in this area is still lacking provisions to provide them adequate special 
protection.  Merely issuing documents or promulgating policies without providing clearly defined 
legal protection has no chance of bringing about the necessary fundamental changes. 
 
V. Conclusion 
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Considering that more than 80 percent of Fortune 500 companies have entered the 
Chinese market, China has become one of the world‟s largest FDI recipients. More and more 
labor-intensive products, labeled “Made in China” have appeared in international market, making 
China likely to become a de facto world factory in the foreseeable future. In addition, the hot 
debate on whether to introduce a Social Clause
202
 in the WTO also requires China, as a relatively 
new member state of WTO, to take its internal labor rights issue seriously so that a criticism of 
social dumping from some WTO member states could be avoided in the future. As such, to 
compare China‟s labor standards with ILO Fundamental Conventions, and finally to 
internationalize China‟s standards has become a valuable topic. 
 
In this article, the writer analyzes the unique status of Chinese trade unions and questions 
their ability to protect the interests of the Chinese working class. In the case of collective 
bargaining, the writer reviews the relevant Chinese labor law and analyzes the reasons for the 
ineffectiveness of the collective bargaining system in China.  As for the issue of forced labor, the 
writer critically evaluates three kinds of forced labor in China: normal workers as forced labor, 
convicted labor reform system and the reeducation through labor (RTL) system.  In the case of 
child labor, according to a review of relevant legislation, the writer pointed out certain internal 
legislation as contradictory and seriously lacking.  In the area of employment discrimination, after 
a general overview of related ILO conventions and Chinese legislation, the writer focuses on 
discrimination with regard to employment based on social origin in China, analyzing a case study 
on Chinese farm workers. In the writer‟s understanding, as a vulnerable group, farm workers do 
not receive enough attention and special protection from Chinese labor legislation. 
 
                                                 
202
 “Social dumping” is “the process whereby manufacturers close down factories in high-wage areas and 
set them up in areas where labor is cheap”. Europa, A Plain Language Guide To Eurojargon available at 
europa.eu.int/abc/eurojargon/index_en.htm). This concept is built on the assumption that countries with 
lower labor standards have artificially lower their labor costs in order to attract more Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI). In order to compete with low labor cost countries, mainly those countries from the South 
where labor supply is plentiful, industrialized countries would have to decrease their high labor standards, 
i.e., harmonizing down-----“race to the bottom”. Based on this hypothetical social dumping thesis, a social 
clause is proposed to be included into trade agreement so that the unfair advantage in international trade 
caused by social dumping could be avoided. The rationale is that a social clause could promote fair 
competition between exporters in developing countries by guaranteeing that those who respect minimum 
labor standards are not penalized for their efforts to promote social development. Besides, it also could 
enable people to benefit from increased world trade. It is argued by some scholars that without such a 
clause, increased international competition might lead to a “destructive downward spiral in the condition of 
work and life of working people all over the world.” Naturally, WTO becomes the focus on this debate at 
the international level. There is a heated debate between the developed states and the developing ones on 
whether to introduce a social clause into GATT, so that a link between trade and labor rights could be 
established. So far, this debate is inconclusive. It is observed that according to some scholars, such as 
professor Sornarajah M., there would never be a social clause in WTO, but the writer would like to argue 
that this view might be too extreme to be right. see also Adelle Blacket, Without Social Clause? Human 
Rights, Trade Theory and Treaty Interpretation, 31 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 1 (1999). also Van Liemt, 
Bilbert, Minimum Labor Standards and International Trade: Would a Social Clause Work?, 4 Int‟l Labor 
Rev. 438-448. 
